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1. Introduction 
Armstrong has long campaigned to persuade us of the veracity of the truthmaker 
principle that every truth has a truthmaker. He has announced the principle as ‘a 
development of the correspondence theory of truth’: it’s what you get when you 
start out from the natural idea that truths are true if and only if they correspond to 
something real and then free yourself from the confining assumption that the 
correspondence relation need be one-one (1997: 128-31, 2004: 16-17, 2010: 
62). Armstrong has also maintained the view that a truthmaker for a truth must 
necessitate that truth (1997: 115-6, 2004: 5-7, 2010: 65). This is why Armstrong 
has adhered to a version of the truthmaker principle according to which for every 
truth there exists something such that the existence of that thing necessitates the 
truth in question.  
 Should we follow Armstrong in identifying the truthmaker principle with a 
development of the correspondence theory? Several philosophers, influenced by 
the deflationary idea that the truth predicate is merely a device of generalization, 
have rejected this identification. Lewis, in particular, has argued that the 
truthmaker principle hasn't anything to do with correspondence; it isn’t even 
concerned with truth (2001: 278-9). But his arguments shouldn't be taken as 
decisive and it’s significant that they’re not. We shouldn’t recognise the ‘cat’ in 
‘cattle’ as significant but we should acknowledge the ‘truth’ in ‘truthmaking’. 
 
2. Is the truthmaker principle a development of the correspondence theory? 
Lewis argues the truthmaker principle hasn’t anything to do with correspondence, 
and so doesn't deserve to be called a correspondence theory, on the grounds 
that some truthmakers don't correspond to the truths they make true.1 Only facts, 
                                                 
1 Of course Lewis doesn’t himself endorse the truthmaker principle in anything 
like the sense that Armstrong et al endorse it. See MacBride 2005 and 2013: 2.4. 
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Lewis tells us, can intelligibly be said to correspond to truths -- presumably 
because only items that share a structure are capable of corresponding to one 
another, and it is only facts that are capable of sharing a structure with a truth. 
But if we admit facts we must also recognize the constituents of facts, things and 
properties. Each of them is a truthmaker for the truth that there exists at least one 
non-fact. Since the truthmakers that aren't facts don't correspond to the truths 
they make true, Lewis concludes that what it means to be a truthmaker can't 
come down to corresponding to anything. 
 But this argument of Lewis's doesn't establish that it's wrong to conceive 
of the truthmaker principle as Armstrong does. The correspondence theory isn't 
just an expression of the very specific idea that we can describe the relation 
between truths and what they represent in terms of correspondence. The 
correspondence theory is also an expression of the very general idea that truth is 
a relation between something that's representational, a truth, and something out 
there in the world that isn't (except where it describes another representation). It 
is because these ideas are different that it’s possible to reconcile abandoning the 
correspondence theory with remaining realist au fond -- with remaining 
committed to the existence of something outside of the circle of our 
representations upon which their truth or falsehood depends. And it's because 
these ideas are different that we can continue to hold to the general idea that 
truth is a relation to something worldly -- regardless of whether the worldly 
relatum is a fact or a non-fact -- even if we give up the specific idea that truth 
consists in correspondence.  
 This, then, is the sense in which, pace Lewis, the truthmaker principle may 
be seen as a development of the correspondence theory. The truthmaker 
principle is an expression of the general idea that truth is a relation to something 
worldly, an idea of which all the different variations of the correspondence theory 
are determinations, an idea that’s always been a key motivation for adopting the 
correspondence theory. Witness Russell’s apologia for the correspondence 
theory in Problems of Philosophy (1912: 70). The unalloyed truthmaker principle 
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is what remains once the specific determinations of the correspondence theory 
have been given up. 
 
3. Is the truthmaker principle a theory of truth? 
It's because the correspondence theory, and a fortiori the truthmaker principle, 
embody the idea that truth is a relation to something worldly that they are prima 
facie rivals to other theories of truth. The redundancy theory denies truth to be 
any kind of relation whatsoever; coherence theories conceive of truth to be a 
different kind of relation altogether, consisting in a relation between a truth and a 
coherent system of other representations. But Lewis also argues that the 
truthmaker principle isn't about truth and so doesn't even qualify as a theory of 
truth. If he's right then the truthmaker principle can hardly differ from bona fide 
theories of truth with respect to whether truth is, or isn't, a genuine relation. Is 
he?  
Lewis invites us to consider the following instance of the truthmaker 
principle: 
 
(1) It's true that cats purr iff there exists something such that the existence of that 
thing implies that cats purr. 
 
Given the redundancy bi-conditional, 
 
(2) It's true that cats purr iff cats purr, 
 
this is equivalent to 
 
(3) Cats purr iff there exists something such that the existence of that thing 
implies that cats purr. 
 
But (3) can't be about truth, Lewis surmises, because it doesn’t mention truth. So 
what is (3) about? Lewis's answer: ‘the existential grounding of the purring of 
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cats’ (2001: 279). Similarly all other instances of the truthmaker principle are 
equivalent, given the relevant redundancy biconditionals, to biconditionals that 
aren't about truth either. They're about the existential groundings of pigs flying, 
donkeys talking and so on ad infinitum. What this shows is that the truthmaker 
principle is equivalent, given the redundancy biconditionals, to an infinite bundle 
of biconditonals about all manner of things, but not particularly about truth. Lewis 
concludes that the truthmaker principle isn't particularly about truth either and 
therefore shouldn’t be called a ‘theory of truth’. Why then does truth get a 
mention in the truthmaker principle? Only, Lewis tells us, ‘for the sake of making 
a long story short’. Mentioning truth enables us to abbreviate this infinite bundle 
of claims -- about the existential groundings of cats purring, pigs flying, donkeys 
talking etc. -- by one concise slogan.  
 
4. Are the instances of the truthmaker principle credible eo ipso? 
Lewis’ argument that the truthmaker principle isn’t a rival to other bona fide 
theories of truth, because it isn’t even about truth, presupposes that the only role 
that truth performs in the truthmaker principle is that of enabling us to formulate a 
generalisation that makes a long story short. But is Lewis within his rights to 
presuppose this?  
If truth figures in the truthmaker principle just to make a long story short 
then the truthmaker principle can’t be any more plausible than the long story it 
shortens. But the instances of the truthmaker principle aren’t themselves credible 
conceived eo ipso; so if the truthmaker principle is just a short version of the long 
story about them then it can’t be plausible either. What makes the instances 
credible for us is that we derive them from the truthmaker principle rather than 
the other way around. We believe all the instances, if we do, only because we 
already believe the truthmaker principle itself, or something equivalent in 
strength. How could this be the case if the truthmaker principle is only an 
abbreviation of its instances? 2 
                                                 
2 Vision (2003) seeks to undermine Lewis’s argument in a different manner. He 
points out that the links Lewis exploits to provide a deflationary argument, from 
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Consider (3). Pull down the veil of ignorance; try to forget about truth for 
the while. What evidence have we remaining for thinking that just because cats 
do something, viz. purr, there is something else whose existence necessitates 
their doing so? Why suppose that there is some additional thing, that isn’t a cat, 
which guarantees their purring? Aren’t cats just doing it for themselves? Don’t bi-
conditionals like (3) just lack credibility conceived eo ipso?  
The choice of examples makes this less plain than it might be. We have 
biological evidence aplenty that there are antecedent physical conditions causally 
responsible for the purring of cats. But this doesn’t lend any credibility to (3) 
because biology doesn’t tell us that there is anything the existence of which 
implies that cats purr. We can screen out the spurious credibility that’s easily 
attributed to (3) if we switch our attention to things’ being thus-and-so that may 
have no physical antecedents. Take, for example, biconditionals like (3) except 
that they concern the posits of fundamental physics' being thus-and-so, e.g. the 
size of the gravitational constant or the initial state of the universe after the Big 
Bang. Whilst there is some speculative work in modern physics that continues to 
hazard explanations for these posits’ being thus-and-so, it’s far from obvious that 
there is anything else the existence of which explains their being thus-and so. It 
remains perfectly tenable that there is no serious explanation of several, perhaps 
many, of these posits of fundamental physics’ being thus-and-so. But it’s not 
obvious either that if there are no physical antecedents for the posits of 
fundamental physics’ being thus-and-so then there is something else the 
existence of which implies their being thus-and-so. It isn’t obvious that the posits 
of fundamental physics can’t be thus-and-so without being necessitated by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1) and (2) to (3), may equally be used to construct an inflationary argument, 
from (3) and (2) to (1), that draws as its conclusion that truths imply, and are 
implied by, the existence of things. There are only grounds for favouring the 
deflationary argument if (2), the redundancy biconditional, is construed as 
reducing a claim about truth to a claim that isn’t. But (2) doesn’t itself assign 
priority to its right-hand-side over its left-hand-side. (2) only says that they’re 
equivalent. It’s only the redundancy theory of truth that assigns the right side of 
(2) priority over its left-hand-side. So Vision concludes that Lewis isn’t entitled to 
this reading of (2) when articulating the correspondence theory. 
 6 
existence of anything else. Why shouldn’t they just be thus-and-so -- without 
benefit of outside supports they don’t appear to need? 
 It may be replied that there is something we’ve overlooked that obviously 
necessitates these things’ being thus-and-so, namely the fact that they’re thus-
and-so. But what kind of guarantee do we have, why should we believe, that if it’s 
the case that things are thus-and-so there is a fact the existence of which implies 
their being thus-and-so? Quite what the difficulties are depends upon what we 
conceive of facts to be. 
 If we conceive of facts as Frege did, as nothing but true propositions, then 
of course there will be a fact that things are thus-and-so if things are thus-and-so. 
But remember we’re not supposed to be talking about truth or true things from 
behind the veil of ignorance -- except as means for making long stories short. 
What’s more, because facts, on this way of thinking, just are true propositions, 
they’re ill suited to serve as the existential grounds of things being thus-and-so. 
Consider the true proposition that cats purr. Because it’s contingent, it must be 
possible for it to be false as well as true. So it must be possible for this 
proposition to exist even if (alas) cats don’t purr, i.e. possible for it to exist when 
it’s false. But if the true proposition that cats purr can exist even if cats don’t purr, 
its existence can hardly imply their doing so.  
Such difficulties disappear if we conceive of facts not as true propositions 
that might have been false, but as the kind of items Armstrong calls states of 
affairs, that Lewis dubs ‘Tractarian facts’, items that might not have existed at all: 
a certain thing’s having a certain property or its having a relation to another thing 
(2001: 277). Unlike true propositions, states of affairs appear admirably suited to 
be existential grounds for the purring of cats, the initial state of the universe after 
the Big Bang, or what-have-you. Who would be surprised to hear that the state of 
affairs that cats purr just is the kind of thing whose existence implies that cats 
purr and that exists if cats purr but not otherwise? Or that the states of affairs that 
the universe has such-and-such an initial state after the Big Bang just is the kind 
of thing whose existence implies that the universe has such-and-such an initial 
state after the Big Bang and that exists if the universe has such-and-such an 
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initial state after the Big Bang but not otherwise? But even though states of 
affairs appear more suited than true propositions to existentially ground the 
purring of cats, the initial state of the universe after the Big Bang, or what-have-
you, it can’t just be assumed that there are enough of them to do all the 
existential grounding that needs to be done. 
It’s plausible that the right-to-left halves of biconditionals such as (3), 
which state that if there is something whose existence implies that a is F then a is 
F, are analytic. It’s the left-to-right halves, which state that if a is F there is 
something whose existence implies that a is F, that impose a substantial demand 
upon the size of the universe.  
When assessing this demand we need to be careful not to be misled by 
the convention, deployed in the preceding paragraph, of describing states of 
affairs in terms of what we take to imply their existence -- describing (e.g.) the 
state of affairs that cats purr using the same subordinate phrase (‘that cats purr’) 
that we use to describe the conditions under which its existence is implied. This 
makes it sound pretty platitudinous to say that there are invariably enough states 
of affairs out there to ensure that biconditionals such as (3) never run the risk of 
being disconfirmed by circumstances in which it is the case that p but there isn’t 
a state of affairs that p. But it only sounds platitudinous because the convention 
we’ve used to describe states of affairs presupposes that whenever it’s the case 
that p there’s something that the definite description ‘the fact that p’ denotes. And 
that isn’t a platitude anymore than it’s a platitude that for every value of ‘F’, 
there’s something that the ‘present king of F’ denotes. Don’t for a moment allow 
yourself to fall back into thinking of facts as just true propositions. If you think of 
facts that way there’s guaranteed to be a fact (a.k.a. a true proposition) that p if p 
but not otherwise. But states of affairs aren’t just true propositions. They’re out 
there, denizens of the universe, things that exist but might not have. It’s not a 
platitude that there are enough of them out there to ensure that the infinite bundle 
of biconditionals that follow from the truthmaker principle are never disconfirmed 
-- no more than it’s a platitude that there’s any other number of contingent things 
out there.  
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Bigelow has also argued, along similar lines to Lewis, that: ‘the word 
“truth” in “Every truth needs a truthmaker” can be eliminated using standard 
“minimalist” techniques’ (2009: 396; see also Horwich 2009: 188-9). Bigelow 
draws the conclusion that ‘paradoxically, truthmaker theses need not be 
essentially concerned with “truth” at all’. Whatever motivates us to endorse the 
instances of the truthmaker principle must be something deeper than concerns 
about truth (Bigelow 1988: 127). But we have seen that the instances lack 
credibility conceived eo ipso. So Bigelow’s friendly offer to eliminate truth from 
the truthmaker principle turns out to be the accidental offer of a poisoned chalice; 
because if truth is eliminated from the truthmaker principle we are left with only a 
motley of claims that aren’t compelling. It seems that we have a choice. Either we 
can recognize that truth is eliminable from the truthmaker principle, in which case 
we should embrace the consequence that we lack any credible motivation for 
believing in truthmakers in the first place. Or we can find a substantive role for 
truth in the truthmaker principle that cannot be eliminated using standard 
minimalist techniques.  
 
5. Is truth a relation between representations and reality? 
In A World of States of Affairs Armstrong actually gave an argument for 
supposing that there are enough states of affairs out there -- to ensure that the 
left-to-right halves of biconditionals like (3) are always respected. It was his 
‘fundamental argument’, intended to furnish quite ‘general support’ for the 
existence of states of affairs, deriving a commitment to them from the truthmaker 
principle itself (1997: 115-6). Armstrong assumed that even though there are 
neither bare particulars nor uninstantiated universals, particulars and universals 
are capable of being prised apart and combined in different ways. It follows from 
this assumption that the contingent truth that a is F is neither necessitated by the 
existence of the particular a, nor the universal F, nor a and F together. This is 
because a and F might both exist and yet a still not be F because a instantiates 
some other universal G whilst F is instantiated by some other particular b. So 
neither a, nor F, nor a and F together, can qualify as truthmakers for the truth that 
 9 
a is F. But according to the truthmaker principle every truth has a truthmaker. 
This led Armstrong to conclude that something else must be responsible for 
making it true that a is F, something else whose existence necessitates that a is 
F. Armstrong posited the state of affairs a's being F to be this something else.3 
From the assumption that it’s true that a is F and the truthmaker principle 
Armstrong thus arrived at the result that if a is F then there is something, viz. a’s 
having F, whose existence implies that a is F.  
If the truthmaker principle were just shorthand for an infinite bundle of 
biconditionals like (3) then Armstrong’s fundamental argument could hardly 
persuade us that states of affairs exist. Not unless we were already convinced 
that these biconditionals are true. But we have seen that they lack credibility 
conceived eo ipso -- whilst their right-to-left halves are plausibly analytic, their 
left-to-right halves certainly aren’t. So if Armstrong is to avoid the charge of biting 
his own tail then the notion of truth that features in the truthmaker principle to 
which he appeals had better not occur merely as a device of abbreviation.  
 Remember that, by Armstrong’s lights, the truthmaker principle is 
supposed to be a development of the correspondence theory of truth, albeit 
shorn of the assumption that correspondence is one-one:  
 
We can accept a correspondence theory, but in a form where it is 
recognised that the relation between true propositions and their 
correspondents is regularly many-many… The correspondents in the 
world in virtue of which true propositions are true are our truthmakers 
(2004: 16-7).  
 
                                                 
3 Armstrong endorses this argument in later writings, although he now proposes 
that states of affairs are ‘no addition of being’ (2004: 48-9). We needn’t dwell 
upon Armstrong’s hyper-curious doctrine of the ontological free lunch. The 
complication isn’t relevant because Armstrong still derives the existence of states 
of affairs from the truthmaker principle, even though he’s downgraded them to 
‘second-class’ existences. 
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This means that Armstrong conceives of truth as a relation between propositions 
and the non-propositional inhabitants of an independent world:  
 
The truth/truthmaking relation is, in a broad sense, a semantic relation. To 
find truthmakers for certain truths, or sorts of truths, one wants to 
postulate entities that stand in various more or less complex relations of 
correspondence to these truths (2004: 37).  
 
Whether the truthmaker principle is just shorthand for an infinite bundle of 
biconditionals like (3) will depend upon whether Armstrong is correct to conceive 
of truth in such substantial terms -- as a relation between something propositional 
and something else worldly -- rather than merely as a shortening device. 
 Armstrong holds truth to be a relation because to conceive of truth 
otherwise is to risk forsaking the realist insight that the world we confront largely 
isn’t of our making. He considers the deflationary idea, cornerstone of the 
redundancy theory, ‘that there is really no truth relation that holds between [a] 
true proposition and the world’ (1997: 128). But he dismisses this idea on the 
grounds that denying truth to be a relation ‘challenges the realistic insight that 
there is a world that exists independently of our thoughts and statements, making 
the latter true or false’ (1997: 128; see also 2004: 5). If there is such a royal road 
from realism to a version of the truthmaker principle, whereby truth is conceived 
as a relation, then we will have a reason for affirming biconditionals like (3), 
because they follow from the truthmaker principle so understood. 
 Unfortunately Armstrong doesn’t tell us how to get from where we are 
onto this royal road and recent contributors to the debate have denied the road’s 
existence altogether (Daly 2005: 95-6). The problem is that realism appears 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the truthmaker principle. It doesn’t appear to 
be necessary because, as Daly points out, there’s no overt inconsistency 
generated by holding the truthmaker principle together with idealism, in the sense 
of affirming that all that exists are states of consciousness. So long as there exist 
enough conscious states to supply truthmakers for whatever truths obtain in an 
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idealist environment then the truthmaker principle will have been respected. 
Realism doesn’t appear to be sufficient for the truthmaker principle either 
because, as Daly also points out, it isn’t inconsistent to deny the truthmaker 
principle whilst continuing to maintain realism, in the sense of affirming that there 
are worldly items that don’t depend upon states of consciousness. Why not? 
Here’s one reason for agreeing with Daly. Realism, in this sense, is a view that 
concerns the relationship that obtains between things in the world and states of 
consciousness, whereas the truthmaker principle is a view that concerns the 
relationship between things in the world and truths. It’s only if we conceive of 
truths as themselves states of consciousness that affirming one of these 
relationships whilst denying the other is liable to give rise to an inconsistency -- 
and only then if we favour the idiosyncratic view that things in the world depend 
for their existence upon truths. 
But whilst realism may be neither necessary nor sufficient for a version of 
the truthmaker principle whereby truth is conceived as a relation, the two may be 
connected in other, more subtle ways. Necessity and sufficiency aren’t the only 
ways for concepts to be related. In particular there may be an important 
explanatory relationship between realism and the truthmaker principle, whereby 
truth is conceived as a relation, so that by harnessing them together we may gain 
insight into the application of some third concept. Consider Dummett’s remark 
that,  
 
The roots of the notions of truth and falsity lie in the distinction between a 
speaker’s being, objectively, right or wrong in what he says when he 
makes an assertion (1978: xvii).  
 
There are stretches of language that we are liable to interpret objectively -- where 
a speaker’s asserting something to be thus-and-so doesn’t make it thus-and-so 
so. One way to make sense of areas of language that sustain, or appear to 
sustain, such an interpretation is to conceive of truth as a relation to something 
that exists independently of us: if the rightness, or wrongness, of an assertion 
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that things are thus-and-so consists in a relation, or the absence of a relation, to 
something that’s independent of the speaker then this explains why her asserting 
that things are thus-and-so doesn’t guarantee that things are thus-and-so. In this 
way realism and the idea that truth is a relation perform complementary roles in 
providing an explanation of the objectivity of those stretches of our discourse that 
are, so to speak, ‘factual’, apt to describe, rightly or wrongly, states of the real 
world. If we have no other means of making intelligible those stretches of 
language we interpret objectively then we would indeed have a secure basis for 
affirming truth to be a relation between what we assert and items comprising the 
world realistically conceived. So before we can answer the question whether 
truth is a relation we must answer another: can we make sense of the objectivity 
of discourse by any other means?4 
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Abstract: Is the truthmaker principle a development of the correspondence theory 
of truth? So Armstrong introduced the truthmaker principle to us, but Lewis 
(2001) influentially argued that it is neither a correspondence theory nor a theory 
of truth. But the truthmaker principle can be correctly understood as a 
development of the correspondence theory if it’s conceived as incorporating the 
insight that truth is a relation between truth-bearers and something worldly. And 
we strengthen rather than weaken the plausibility of the truthmaker principle if we 
conceive of truth as performing a substantial rather than deflationary role in the 
truthmaker principle.  
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